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CHAPTER 49
The Metaphysics of Surrogacy
Suki Finn
IntroductIon
Consider the following philosophical question about pregnancy regarding the 
metaphysical relationship between the mother and the fetus:
Is the fetus a part of, or contained by, the mother?
An answer to this question will impact significantly on bioethical issues 
regarding reproduction, particularly surrogacy. Yet despite its impact, answers 
have been generally underexplored in metaphysics and presupposed in public 
policy. In this chapter I outline some answers and explore their relevance for 
policies on surrogacy. A surrogate mother, as defined in the United Kingdom, 
is someone who (a) gestates the fetus for, and may also (b) donate their egg to, 
the intended parent(s). The first, (a), is named a ‘host’ (or ‘full’) surrogate; the 
second, (b), is named a ‘straight’ (or ‘partial’) surrogate. Surrogacy potentially 
implies three physically and legally distinct mothers: (i) genetic; (ii) gestational; 
and (iii) social. Assuming these can be separated and embodied by different 
people, a host surrogate is a gestational mother, a straight surrogate is both a 
gestational and genetic mother, and an intended parent may be a genetic and 
social mother. At the center of what it is to be any type of surrogate mother is 
the notion of a gestational mother since this is the mother that is pregnant, and 
it is this pregnant relationship between mother and fetus that is of interest here.
Since it is the metaphysics of pregnancy that I intend to apply to surrogacy, 
this chapter will focus on the metaphysical relationship specifically between the 
gestational mother in the surrogate arrangement and the fetus (regardless of 
whether the fetus is genetically related to the gestational mother, thus applying 
to both host and straight surrogates).1 This is because I am interested in what 
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pregnancy is like per se, and I take for the purposes of this chapter that a sur-
rogate is no less pregnant than any other gestational mother and that the genes 
of the fetus make no difference to this. I should note that when I speak of the 
fetus, I use the term loosely to generally refer to whatever the gestational 
mother is pregnant with at any time during the pregnancy, including the 
zygote, embryo, blastocyst, and so on. I also note that my discussion of the 
public policies on surrogacy is connected to the policies in the United Kingdom. 
Yet much of what I say can be generalized to policies elsewhere.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: In the first section, I discuss surrogacy 
as a case of pregnancy. In the second section, I outline two metaphysical mod-
els of pregnancy—the Container model and the Parthood model. Then in the 
following sections, I apply these models to surrogacy, respectively, by assessing 
whether the conception of surrogacy utilizes the model and also by demon-
strating what the conception of surrogacy would be like if the other model 
were utilized. The final section connects metaphysics with ethics and public 
policy and poses some methodological questions, before concluding.
Surrogacy as Contract Pregnancy
In this chapter I aim to show (i) how different metaphysical models of preg-
nancy give different understandings of the surrogate arrangement and (ii) how 
the way surrogacy is conceptualized in public policy illuminates a presupposed 
metaphysical model of pregnancy. As Shanley points out, the language that we 
use to understand the role of the gestational mother in surrogacy highlights 
some metaphysical issues:
The ways in which proponents and opponents of surrogacy describe the gesta-
tional mother reveal important but unarticulated differences in their views in… 
[their] understandings of the self.2
I agree that an understanding of the self plays a role in how we conceptualize 
surrogacy. Specifically, I aim to articulate how different views of surrogacy 
reveal different understandings of the parts of the self and what the self con-
tains. Generally, it is an understanding of the pregnant self that I take to under-
pin views of surrogacy.
It may be that the way pregnancy is conceptualized in general may not 
match up with the way surrogacy is conceptualized. This is odd given that 
 surrogacy is an example of being pregnant—it is a specific way of becoming a 
gestational mother, a pregnant being. Thus, the gestational mother in a sur-
rogate arrangement for our metaphysical purposes is just like a gestational 
mother who is pregnant by other means. As such, what we say about pregnancy 
should carry over to what we say about surrogacy. If a certain model of preg-
nancy is true, then it is also true for surrogate pregnancy.3 Despite implications 
in the word ‘surrogate’, surrogacy is a case of real pregnancy, not a replacement 
to serve only as someone else’s assisted reproductive technology. I agree with 
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Rothman that ‘this is not a “surrogate” relationship, but an actual lived one’, 
as ‘one is not in a “substitute” or “replacement” or “surrogate” relationship 
− the [gestational mother] and [fetus] are in an intimate physical and social 
relationship’.4 I henceforth use the term ‘surrogate’ in scare quotes and talk of 
‘contract pregnancy’5 rather than surrogacy to emphasize that I treat surrogacy 
as a full case of pregnancy.
the MetaphysIcal Models of pregnancy
Our main question of interest here is whether the fetus is a part of, or merely 
contained by, the gestational mother. For x to be a part of a whole y is roughly 
for x to be one of the things that compose y, where x and y are not identical. 
For x to be contained by y is for x to be inside or surrounded by something else 
while not also being a part of y. Therefore, parthood and containment are 
incompatible states,6 and so the fetus is either a part of the gestational mother 
or contained by the gestational mother, but not both at the same time.7 It is 
worth noting that this is not a matter of choice, nor an argument over the 
 language we use to describe what is otherwise considered the same situation. 
Rather, it seems, there is a fact of the matter to be found, and the truth about 
the metaphysical relationship between the fetus and the gestational mother will 
have far-reaching implications for our moral and legal practices involving preg-
nancy, as I will demonstrate with the case of contract pregnancy. I will now 
consider these two perspectives regarding the metaphysical relationship 
between the fetus and gestational mother, naming them as the Parthood model 
and the Container model, and I will then apply them to contract pregnancy.
Parthood Model
This model is held by Kingma and takes the fetus to be a part of the gesta-
tional mother: ‘fetuses are a proper part of the pregnant organisms  – like 
hearts, kidneys, nails and hair’.8 So the gestational mother is the whole, and 
this gestational mother has many parts like limbs and organs, for example, 
where the fetus is simply one of those parts. And so we can say on this 
Parthood model that the fetus is a part of the gestational mother, just like any 
other part of the gestational mother. Of course, this isn’t to say that the fetus 
is not a special part of the gestational mother—it can be very different to 
other parts of the gestational mother, as all the parts are different to each 
other in many ways. So it is important to note that this model does not entail 
that the fetus is degraded to having a similar status to limbs and organs; rather 
all that it entails is that the fetus is a part of the gestational mother (which 
limbs and organs happen to be too). In summary, the fetus and gestational 
mother are not seen as separate individual entities, but rather are related to 
each other as a part is to a whole.
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Container Model
The Container model can be seen as the extreme opposite of the Parthood 
model. According to the Container model, a gestational mother is literally a 
container for the fetus. This is the view held by Smith and Brogaard, who pro-
vide the analogy of the fetus being inside the gestational mother in the same 
way as ‘a tub of yogurt is inside your refrigerator’.9 The refrigerator, like the 
gestational mother, is said to have some sort of cavity, hole, space, or the like, 
within which the tub of yogurt or fetus can reside. Just as the tub of yogurt is 
not a part of the refrigerator but is merely inside it, a fetus is not a part of the 
gestational mother but is merely inside it. Again, this does not reduce the status 
of the fetus to anything like a tub of yogurt, as very special things can be inside 
other things. However, it does reduce the relationship between the fetus and 
the gestational mother to one between separate individual entities that are con-
nected only insofar as one is contained within the other.
Now that I have outlined these two extreme opposing models of the meta-
physical relationship between the gestational mother and the fetus, we have 
two distinct ways of understanding the metaphysics of pregnancy, both ways of 
which are defended in the literature demonstrating the live debate about the 
relationship. Given that in every contract pregnancy (whether it be as a host or 
straight surrogacy) it is the ‘surrogate’ that is pregnant, we are now in a posi-
tion where we can evaluate what such an arrangement is like on a metaphysical 
level. By understanding the general metaphysical model of pregnancy, we can 
understand the metaphysical relationship between the ‘surrogate’ and the 
fetus. Is the ‘surrogate’ (like any other gestational mother) a container for the 
fetus, or is the fetus a part of the ‘surrogate’? And which model is portrayed in 
our public policies? I will now look at each option in turn.
surrogacy as contaInMent
The Container model is particularly evident in our conceptualization of con-
tract pregnancy. In contract pregnancy we imagine the gestational mother as an 
incubator or environment for the fetus, which develops as an individual entity, 
separate from and merely inside the gestational mother. For example, the nam-
ing of the ‘surrogate’ as the ‘host’ demonstrates that they are seen as hosting 
something other inside of them. Interestingly, the term ‘host’ is also used in 
philosophical contexts to refer to the thing that encompasses a hole, thereby 
suggesting that the host ‘surrogate’ is analogous to a thing with a hole for 
‘guests’ to move in and out of.10 One such host ‘surrogate’ mother at ‘Surrogacy 
UK’ described the process of contract pregnancy as ‘the job of trying to help 
bake someone’s bun in our oven’,11 and the ‘Harley Street Fertility Clinic UK’ 
states that ‘in this arrangement, the commissioning couple literally rent the 
womb of the surrogate host’.12 This makes clear that the ‘surrogate’ mother is 
seen as a container, like an oven or a room to rent, where the fetus is a different 
entity like a bun or a guest that inhabits the space that the host provides.
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Contract pregnancy is widely regarded as a service of gestation, where what 
the ‘surrogate’ provides is the use of their body as a space within which the 
fetus can grow. As a result, contract pregnancy is thought of as bodily labor, 
where the work required is to provide nutrients and physical care to the fetus. 
This in turn implies that the role of the ‘surrogate’ is to provide a safe space for 
the fetus to grow inside of them, rather than the role of the ‘surrogate’ to be 
to grow the fetus as a part of them. This strongly suggests a Container model 
has been presupposed in our understanding of contract pregnancy. A Container 
model also underpins our public policy on contract pregnancy, as we can see in 
the following quotations from legal documentation where the ‘surrogate’ is 
referred to as ‘carrying’ the fetus that is implanted ‘in’ her. We do not ‘carry’ 
what is a part of ourselves—rather we carry what is not a part of ourselves. And 
if something is implanted into us, then we may infer that it at least was not a 
part of us and is just inside us. These quotations (with all emphasis my own) 
thus demonstrate a clear assumption of the Container model:
Surrogacy is the practice whereby one woman (the surrogate mother) carries a 
child for another person(s) (the commissioning couple) as the result of an agree-
ment prior to conception that the child should be handed over to that person 
after birth… The woman who carries the child is the surrogate mother, or ‘sur-
rogate’. She may be the genetic mother (‘partial’ surrogacy) – i.e. using her own 
egg – or she may have a fertilised embryo – which may be provided by the com-
missioning couple  – implanted in her womb using in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) 
techniques (‘host’ or ‘full’ surrogacy).13 (Brazier Report 1998)
(2) ‘Surrogate mother’ means a woman who carries a child in pursuance of an 
arrangement-(a) made before she began to carry the child, and (b) made with a 
view to any child carried in pursuance of it being handed over to, and parental 
responsibility being met (so far as practicable) by, another person or other per-
sons… (6) A woman who carries a child is to be treated for the purposes of sub-
section 2a above as beginning to carry it at the time of the insemination or of the 
placing in her of an embryo, of an egg in the process of fertilization or of sperm 
and eggs, as the case may be, that results in her carrying the child.14 (Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985)
So it is clear that the ‘surrogate’ is doing the carrying of the intended par-
ents’ fetus that is put inside the ‘surrogate’, and this carrying is done for the 
intended parents. But in treating a gestational mother as only a container, one 
disregards their gestational contribution and reduces them to an incubator of 
sorts. Now, incubators do have important roles, but if that is the only role for 
the gestational mother then contract pregnancy looks like the rental of a womb. 
Understanding contract pregnancy in this way helps to remove any ownership 
or connection that the ‘surrogate’ may have with the fetus, such that there is 
no integration or interaction between them that could interfere with the 
intended parents’ claim to the fetus. This is due to viewing the fetus as being 
placed inside the ‘surrogate’ where the transition at birth is the ‘mere passage 
of [the fetus] from one environment to another’.15 This contributes to 
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 depersonalizing the gestational mother by seeing them only as a space to go in 
and out of, a space that is rented in contract pregnancy. As Anderson notes:
The commercial promoters of surrogacy commonly describe the surrogate moth-
ers as inanimate objects: mere ‘hatcheries’, ‘plumbing’, or ‘rented property’  – 
things without emotions.16
Even the usage of the term ‘container’ has been used in this context, for 
example:
The social message of this legal institution [of surrogacy] is that a woman can be 
a container for somebody else’s child. [There is a] cancellation of the ‘surrogate’ 
mother as a person to reduce her to a fetal container that gets paid, to a preg-
nancy worker.17
The [surrogate] is presented not as a feeling human being who experiences 
her pregnancy on an existential level, but as a container, an incubator.18
I thus take the similarities between our conception of contract pregnancy 
and the Container model of pregnancy to be striking. It appears that not only 
do promoters of contract pregnancy presuppose such a model, but they may 
also depend on it. In order to conceive of the gestational mother in a contract 
pregnancy as a ‘surrogate’ and not the mother, they need to be seen only as a 
swappable container for the fetus without having any claim to the fetus. This is 
in line with the message being fed to ‘surrogates’: ‘The surrogates are periodi-
cally told that their role is only as a vessel’.19
surrogacy as parthood
I now turn to our other model of pregnancy, the Parthood model, and see how 
this interacts with the way we understand contract pregnancy. On the Parthood 
model, the fetus that is ‘carried’ by the ‘surrogate’ mother is literally a part of 
the ‘surrogate’ mother. This seems to make the term ‘carry’ inapplicable, since 
we do not tend to think of ourselves as carrying our own parts like our organs. 
So rather than renting a space, contract pregnancy then appears more like the 
trade of a body part (namely, the fetus, a part of the gestational mother). Now 
if this fetus is itself a human (which it is at least after birth), then contract preg-
nancy is both a trade of a body part and a trade of a human, which is illegal. 
Furthermore, if the fetus is a part of the gestational mother, then the gesta-
tional mother is not so easily interchangeable and replaceable by any ‘surro-
gate’. One would not simply be removing the fetus from its container during 
birth but actually detaching the fetus from its whole. The connection between 
a part and its whole seems far stronger and more intimate than the connection 
between the contained and its container, making the swapping of the whole 
less flexible than the swapping of the container. A container can change what it 
contains without much change to itself, just as the contained can quite easily 
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find a new container without much change to itself. Whereas a whole cannot 
change its parts without some variation in what the whole is like, the removal 
of a part from a whole is more disruptive than the removal of the contained 
from a container.
Such a view of contract pregnancy as a transaction in body parts was sug-
gested in the Brazier report, where the comparison motivated their recommen-
dation to only allow ‘surrogates’ to be paid for their expenses, rather than for 
the fetus itself:
Parallels have been drawn between surrogacy and live organ donation. In the UK, 
bodily parts may be donated only as a gift for which no payments are allowed. We 
believe that surrogacy should be informed by the same values.20
Even on the Container conception of contract pregnancy, the fetus would need 
to be treated as a gift since otherwise it may also fall foul to the accusation of 
being a trade in babies. Yet on the Parthood model the gestational mother does 
not contain a fetus that may already ‘belong’ to someone else—it is her own 
part to give away. There is more claim to ownership over what is a part of you 
than what you contain, especially if someone else claims ownership over what 
they put in you to contain for them. So, rather than the returning of someone 
else’s genetic material that the ‘surrogate’ contains (as the Container model 
would suggest), on the Parthood model, we see the giving away of the ‘sur-
rogate’s’ own gestational product which was a part of them. Furthermore, if 
the intended parents in some sense owned the fetus, then they would be claim-
ing ownership over a part of the ‘surrogate’s’ body, which doesn’t seem right.
It therefore seems that contract pregnancy is less palatable when understood 
with a Parthood model than with a Container model. This is because of the 
deeper connection afforded between a part and its whole than between the 
contained and its container. If the fetus is a part of the gestational mother, then 
the ‘surrogate’ is connected to the fetus in a way that is of importance to the 
identity of both the ‘surrogate’ and the fetus. In providing more than an envi-
ronment, it is less easy to see how any gestational mother will do for the role of 
the ‘surrogate’. Furthermore, the fetus becomes an actual part of the ‘surro-
gate’ themselves, rather than something that the ‘surrogate’ simply houses 
inside of them for a while. With all of this in mind, when we understand con-
tract pregnancy with a Parthood model, the arrangement looks more like the 
donation of a body part than the rental of a body space.
If surrogacy is to be aligned with the donation of a body part though, we 
must keep in mind that the part being donated is, in the end, a human. Legally, 
humans may not be donated, just as they may not be traded. However, humans 
can be adopted, and there do seem to be similarities in the transferal of parental 
rights and responsibilities in both the cases of adoption and contract preg-
nancy. This is clear when we notice that in a contract pregnancy the gestational 
mother is to be considered the mother until a parental order has been issued to 
the intended parents after birth. (However, this is also confusing given the 
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contrasting message that the ‘surrogate’ is considered only as a womb to carry 
the intended parents’ fetus.) As the following policy states:
The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her 
of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated as the 
mother of the child.21 (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008)
Given this, the ‘surrogate’ is the mother, so perhaps we should just do away 
with the term ‘surrogate’ after all. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 2008 (Section 54) also details the various and lengthy conditions for trans-
ferring legal parental status from the ‘surrogate’ mother to the intended par-
ents after birth. What is it then that significantly distinguishes a contract 
pregnancy from adoption? Why not call the ‘surrogate’ simply the mother, and 
why not call surrogacy simply a pre-arranged adoption, and then treat them as 
such? Well, one of the problems with this is that the policy on adoption is such 
that one cannot set up an arrangement for adoption prior to birth, whereas in 
a contract pregnancy, the arrangement is always set up prior to birth. So, if we 
are to understand contract pregnancy according to a Parthood model and take 
seriously the naming of the gestational mother as the legal mother (until paren-
tal rights are transferred), then our policies on contract pregnancy will need to 
be more coherently aligned with those policies on body part donation and 
adoption.
connectIons to ethIcs and polIcy
Finally, how does our metaphysical understanding of pregnancy impact on the 
ethics and policies regarding contract pregnancy? It seems, given the way things 
currently stand, policies have been built without a critical reflection of the 
metaphysical model of pregnancy in place. But how strong would the influence 
of such a critical reflection be? If model X of pregnancy clashes with our poli-
cies or ethical responses to reproductive issues, do we reject model X on that 
basis? Or, if we learn that model X is true of pregnancy for other reasons, 
should that be what determines how we ought to respond to reproductive 
issues and change our policies on that basis? This is a deep and general meth-
odological issue that I do not have space to tackle, but for now I note how 
Smith and Brogaard connect their metaphysical views on when a human starts 
to exist with ethical issues in abortion and stem cell research:
What follows is an exercise in ontology, and clearly no conclusions of an ethical 
sort can be drawn directly from the answer to any ontological question… It seems 
to us, however, to be equally clear that an answer to the question as to when a 
human organism begins to exist can be of some help in settling the difficult prob-
lems which arise in connection with the issue of abortion and embryonic stem cell 
experimentation.22
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I agree that given the complexity of the debates in reproductive ethics, the 
metaphysical models I have outlined will not on their own (as ‘exercises in 
ontology’) be sufficient to determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of any par-
ticular problematic case, since the models alone do not determine, for example, 
the rights that a gestational mother has over their body or the produce of their 
body, nor the moral status of the fetus or what sort of thing the fetus is. 
However, many of the reasons that we cite to support our stance on reproduc-
tive issues are based (sometimes unknowingly) on metaphysical grounds, just 
as we seem to utilize a Container model in the traditional articulation of con-
tract pregnancy. And so these debates will in part depend on their philosophi-
cal foundations given their philosophical presuppositions.
It is simply good practice to challenge the assumptions in one’s arguments, 
and given that there appears to be an assumption of a Container view with 
regard to contract pregnancy, I argue that we should therefore pay such models 
closer attention. So, although no moral conclusions follow directly from the 
metaphysical models I’ve outlined, we do need to get clearer about these meta-
physical issues if we want to be justified in our use of metaphysical models in 
public policies on contract pregnancy. Given that our policies are written in 
such a way that utilize metaphysical models, let us work on establishing which 
model is correct before basing our law on it. Or else, our policies should be 
written without the use of any metaphysical models. So, unless policies can be 
metaphysically neutral, they had better be metaphysically informed.
conclusIon
To summarize, in this chapter I have shown that there is more than one way to 
think about the metaphysics of pregnancy and that this will have implications 
for how we view the ‘surrogate’ relationship in a contract pregnancy. It seems 
that many of the reasons why we have an ethical or political view about con-
tract pregnancy are based on metaphysical grounds, and therefore I have 
argued that such metaphysical assumptions need to be acknowledged and dis-
charged or removed. To do otherwise would leave our policies unjustified and 
potentially based on false presuppositions.23
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